

# Human Factors Aspects during Post-Maintenance Flight Tests



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
Continuous Safety

# Outline

- Post Maintenance Flight Tests
- Human Factors (HF) Aspects
- Research methodology
- Haz. Ident. & Risk Manag. Appr.
- Human Factors fundamentals
- Proposed Strategy to conduct safe FTs
- Recommendations




# Study case



# Post Maintenance Flight Tests

- Necessary to confirm Rotorcraft airworthiness performance data
- Risky activity
- No repetitive activity, no frequent data
- Performed by highly qualified staff
- Performed in busy skies
- Improvisation increases the risk




# Flight Tests - Objectives

- Flight testing is conducted to ensure that the overall performance or handling qualities of a rotorcraft have not fallen below a **defined standard** (i.e.: in the RFM).
- After certain fault rectification or replacement of components when checks for proper operation cannot be carried out on ground.

# Flight Tests - Objectives

- To deliver **safe** Flight Tests operations and meeting the technical objectives.



Risk(s)




*Control Measure*



# Flight Tests – HF Objectives


- To deliver ***safe*** Flight Tests operations and



Courtesy: [www.governors.nl](http://www.governors.nl)

# Safe Operations - Objectives

- Controlling "the rising risk"





# HF aspects

- Pilots are asked to deliver their best
- Non-cyclical-activity
- Excessive reliance on “experienced” staff
- Provision of clear policy, procedures and practices are essential
- Planning is a key factor




# Research Methodology

The following topics were reviewed	Data gathering
Fundamentals of HF	Reviewing the Human Limitations to FT
Risk Management	Hazard Identification, Risk awareness and system protection
Actual Legislation	EASA and NAA Rules, Regulations and good practices
Industry Approach assessment to FT	How the industry is actually managing the issue
Focus on	system safety and on risk Identification and management.

*R. Sumwalt (2007), vice chairman of the NTSB, likened the hunt for precursors to "reading tea leaves" because it can require imagination to tie together incidents that don't seem hazardous at first blush.*

# Human Factors - Fundamentals




Source: GAIN Book, Issue 2, 2001

# Human Factors - Fundamentals



Causes 100% ↑




The picture: ANSA

The picture: ULSTEIN-BILD


Source: HFCAS

# HF - Systemic Vulnerability




Source: HFACS

# HF – Unsafe Supervision



Source: HFACS


# HF–Preconditions for Unsafe Acts



Source: HFACS

# Human Factors – Shell Model

The Shell Model Modified by Hawkins.



S = Software  
(procedures,  
symbology, etc.)

H=Hardware (machine)

E=Environment

L=Liveware (human)

Source: ICAO Doc 9859, SMM.



# HF– Basic Emotions




## Basic emotions

- Happiness, panic, anger,
- Anxiety, guilt, shame



## Cockpit emotions

- Admiration, pride, amazement,
- Fear, annoyance, humiliation.



## Pilot Mental States

- Impatient, task saturated, confused.
- Distracted, inadequate, excited.

# HF – FAA's 5 Hazardous Attitudes



# Pilots: The Flight Test Rules


Guidance: Flight Test Schedule (FTS)

SOPs


RFM

Dedicated  
Manufacturer  
Chapter


# Flight Test Schedule - Risk




# Risk Assessment: Task – Rule boundary




# Risk Assessment – Time factor



# Risk Assessment – Severity



# Risk Assessment – Policy





# Manoeuvre & control measure

## Normal

- SOPs – Flight Crew is Familiar

## Close to rotorcraft limitations

- RFM – Flight Crew Self familiarization required
- (NOTE: Often RFM is not OM Part B)

## Beyond rotorcraft limitations

- Dedicated Manufacturer's Chapter in RFM
- Provision to Flight Crew of a dedicated training/SIM session

# Survey Questionnaire

Questionnaire sent to 57 aircraft AOC's Italian Operators:


- 10 responded
- 1 declined to participate
- 1 provided informal data
- After a cleaning procedure the assessment is based on No. 8 Operators

Question Number	Yes	No	N/A
No. 1 ( <i>Policy for flight tests</i> )	6 (75%)	2 (25%)	0
No. 2 ( <i>If it includes Human Factors aspects</i> )	3 (37,5%)	5 (62,5%)	0
No. 3 ( <i>Identification of Risks</i> )	4 (50%)	4 (50%)	0
No. 4 ( <i>Involvement in Safety occurrences</i> )	4 (50%)	4 (50%)	0
No. 5 ( <i>Implementation of corrective action</i> )	4 (50%)	3 (37,5%)	1
No. 6 ( <i>Monitoring of effectiveness of the corrective actions</i> )	5 (62,5%)	3 37,5%)	1

# Findings from Docs assessment


Confidentially the author reviewed No. 10 OM Part A/Ch. 8.7 AOC's Holders

- 5 were Italian AOC
- 5 were EU AOC




bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la081127.en/pdf/d-la081127.en.pdf

# The organization must provide



Source: City University, Safety by Design Module Course notes.

# Finding No. 1: Define the owner of the process



**WARNING:** No one cannot "add" tests in flight


# Six varieties of rule-related performance

	<b>Good Rules</b>	<b>Bad Rules</b>	<b>No Rules</b>
<b>Correct Performance</b>	<i>Correct compliance</i>	<i>Correct violation</i>	<i>Correct Improvisation</i>
<b>Erroneous Performance</b>	<i>Misvention</i>	<i>Mispliance</i>	<i>Mistake</i>



Source: J. Reason (1997).

# A generic example of Risk assessment in the Process of F.T.




# Which could be the main risks?

- HF of staff: exposure to emotional triggers
- The combination of an error + a violation
- Ramp activity
- ATC
- Working area
- Other FT crew or members
- Secondary failures






# Actual Legislation



# Actual AOC Holder Documentation



# Recommendations

Finding	Action
Define clear policy on FT	Part A, 8.7 – Policy
Define clear FT Procedures	Part A, 8.7 – Procedures
Define a FT pilot qualification process	Part D – Qualification & Training
Define a list of pilots (EASA/M.A.706)	CAME – FT Chapter
Define clear FT Practices	Part A, 8.7 – Mandatory briefing
Consider HF aspects of FT	Part A, 8,7 – HF aspects during FT
Review Instructions to FT crew	CAME – Flight Test Schedule (FTS)
Define possible FT fleet wise	CAME – FT Requirement
Review & up-to-date risk assessment	F.S.R.B.: FOPH, CAMO PH, QM, SM
Define recurrent training	Part D – FT Recurrent training

[caa.co.uk/docs/1455/CheckFlightHandbookIssue2Point2-April2009.pdf](http://caa.co.uk/docs/1455/CheckFlightHandbookIssue2Point2-April2009.pdf)

# Summary

- Key points to deliver a safe post-M.F.T.
- The requirement to establish documented procedures for F.T.
- The H.F. aspects during post-M.F.T.
- The hazard and risk assessment approach
- Safety aspects that can help the organisation in delivering safer post-M.F.T.

# Thank you!



# Contacts

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